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Introduction
In small open economies with …xed exchange rates, capital ‡ight often is the root cause of foreign exchange market pressure. The central bank faces the trilemma that it cannot accommodate capital ‡ight with a monetary expansion, while at the same time keeping the exchange rate …xed. At some point countries run out of reserves and a speculative attack breaks the monetary arrangements apart.
The events of the euro crisis have been highly reminiscent of a speculative attack on a …xed exchange rate. In the winter 2011/12, internal capital ‡ight reached its peak when national central banks (NCBs) provided one trillion euros of re…nancing credit to banks, thereby accommodating investors'preferences to hold assets in safe countries. 1 This happened at a time when the ECB pursued an exit strategy for the euro area, by raising interest rates and collateral standards. These parallel developments generated severe market tensions and rising break-up expectations in early December 2011, when banks also started using the swap line and borrowed from the ECB in US Dollars. 2 A major policy reversal, including …rst two tranches of 3-year longer-term re…nancing operations (LTROs) and later the promise of unlimited liquidity …nally stopped these capital ‡ight dynamics. Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, interprets the ECB's actions as a "solid shield against further speculative attacks." 3 The mechanism behind the attack, however, is often not well understood. What are the constraints for NCBs when providing re…nancing credit to banks? What is the target of a potential speculative attack from the investors'perspective? What has been the trigger event that caused speculative capital ‡ows within the euro area? Finally, was the attack in 2011/12 successful, or not?
To address these questions, we analyze the institutional characteristics of the euro area with a particular focus on the NCBs in the Eurosystem and the TARGET2 clearing system. We show theoretically that the common central bank of a currency union cannot simultaneously control the monetary base and delegate the implementation of a full-allotment policy to NCBs. At the time of a speculative attack, it is forced to abandon one of the following incompatible objectives: (i) the full-allotment policy, (ii) its monetary target or (iii) the single currency. This result is reminiscent of the well-known impossible trinity. In contrast to the literature, however, we focus on policy options within a common currency area, not on individual countries. Financial markets anticipating this predicament will attack the currency union when the ability to accommodate internal capital ‡ight-given a particular monetary target-reaches a critically low level.
From an investor's perspective, we highlight that a ‡ight-to-safety motivation helps to explain capital ‡ight within the euro area. 4 To understand the role of the Eurosystem in the crisis dynamics, it is important to keep in mind that the NCBs'liquidity provision is closely linked to the amount of safe and risky assets available for trading in the markets. The liquidity provision in the crisis countries has absorbed risky assets that were used as collateral when borrowing from NCBs. At the same time, the liquidity absorption of the safe-haven countries has released safe assets from being tied-up as collateral. This way, they became available to be purchased by investors and the price reaction of safe assets to capital ‡ight was less pronounced. A key aspect of the euro crisis is that the amount of risky assets absorbed, and safe assets entering the market, was limited by the ECB's decision to maintain a certain monetary target. We argue that the anticipated increase in the price of safe assets, after the Eurosystem reached a critical limit, contributed to the dynamics of speculative capital ‡ows. In a portfolio balance model of the exchange rate, we show that a strict monetary target for the aggregate euro area, combined with a full-allotment policy for NCBs, eventually creates euro-break-up expectations on the side of investors.
The empirical analysis in this paper consists of two parts. First, we illustrate key macroeconomic variables, as well as indicators from central bank balance sheets in an event-study analysis, centered around the ECB's monetary expansion on December 8, 2011 . In particular, we document the patterns of re…nancing credit, deposits, reserves, swap lines and TARGET2 balances. We derive a set of stylized facts from this analysis by comparing a group of countries in crisis-Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS)-with a set of countries that have been the recipients of capital ‡ight-Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg (DNFL). We illustrate that the observed patterns in these country groups are strikingly similar to those when comparing, for instance, Mexico and the United States around the Tequila Crisis in 1994/95. Second, based on the theoretical analysis, we construct a new proxy of exchange market pressure in the euro area. We externally verify this index by showing that it correlates with other indexes of break-up risk such as Google searches for break-up or the implied break-up probability from betting platforms.
Finally, based on theory and the empirical analysis, we argue that the ECB's exit strategy in the summer of 2011 can be interpreted as a trigger event for the attack. It added a third policy objective to the earlier decision on full allotment and the overall objective of keeping the single currency intact. The monetary expansion in December 2011 postponed the break-up scenario and the promise of unlimited liquidity in the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Program ultimately forestalled the dynamics. While the attack, from today's perspective, was unsuccessful, the ECB's exit strategy was unsuccessful as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the behavior of key macroeconomic variables around December 2011. Section 3 provides institutional details of the TARGET2 system and shows how cross-border capital ‡ows a¤ect central bank balance sheets. It derives the European version of the trilemma from a central bank perspective. Section 4 integrates the institutional particularities of the TARGET2 system in a standard portfolio balance model of the exchange rate. The exchange market pressure index for the euro area is presented in Section 5. After discussing the links of our paper to the existing literature in Section 6, the …nal section provides policy conclusions. 3 
Stylized Facts
We start our analysis with the pattern of key macroeconomic variables around December 2011 when the ECB abolished its exit strategy and announced an unprecedented monetary expansion, often referred to as the "Big Bazooka." The collection of graphs extends and complements the work of Sinn and Wollmershäuer (2012), who …rst described the TARGET2 system and the existence of a balance of payments crisis in Europe in an academic paper 5 . In subsequent sections, these empirical facts will be used as a basis for the theoretical analysis.
Stylized Fact 1: In the beginning of 2011, the ECB followed an exit strategy for the euro area.
At the peak of the …nancial crisis, in October 2008, the ECB had reacted with a full-allotment policy, which led to an expansion of re…nancing credit to private banks by e372 bn. Thereafter, however, it has managed to return aggregate lending back to its original trend growth (see Panel A of Figure 1 ). This return to trend growth was not only due to a reduced demand for re…nancing credit, but rather was a result of a policy reversal of the ECB. Since mid-2009, the ECB had gradually started an exit strategy, which can be seen by the tightening of collateral standards and an increase in the main re…nancing rate in the beginning of 2011 (see Panel B of Figure 1 ). For example, the ECB decided on additional requirements for asset-backed securities to be eligible for use as collateral (November 2009), suspended the use of foreign-currency debt instruments (April 2010), applied higher haircuts (July 2010) and underlined that the ECB is able to "suspend, limit or exclude counterparties'access to monetary policy instruments on the grounds of prudence" and to reject or limit the use of assets submitted as collateral by speci…c banks (October 2010). Moreover, ECB o¢ cials started talking about exit strategies and increased the main re…nancing rate from 1.0% in the …rst quarter of 2011 to 1.5% in the third quarter. By mid-2010, the media widely regarded ECB monetary policy to be in the process of exiting from its exceptional credit provision. Stylized Fact 2: The ECB' s exit strategy was (i) preceeded by large current account de…cits and (ii) followed by a sharp reversal in private capital ‡ows.
The second empirical observation is that there has been a continuous process of current account de…cits, prior to 2011, in the GIIPS countries. The current account de…cit is the "usual suspect"that has been identi…ed as the fundamental cause of balance of payments crises in the literature. In Figure  2 , which adds up the current account de…cits in the GIIPS, one can clearly see an uninterrupted decline of the cumulative current account balance until 2012, when the process appears to have stabilized at about e760 bn. 6 The other two dashed lines show how this current account de…cit has been …nanced. Up to 2011, private capital in ‡ows were the largest source of …nancing. In mid-2011, however, private funding started to fall and fully reversed in the beginning of 2012. Since then, the GIIPS have been characterized by private capital out ‡ows. Instead, public capital ‡ows started to rise. Figure 2 shows o¢ cial capital ‡ows de…ned as the sum of all bilateral and multilateral lending, including loans by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and intra-Eurosystem liabilities (TARGET2), which have become the largest component of public capital towards the end of the sample. 
Stylized Fact 3: Monetary aggregates mask asymmetries on NCB balance sheets.
The pattern of monetary aggregates, such as the re…nancing credit displayed in Figure 1 , has been masking important asymmetries across countries' NCBs. While raising the interest rate and tightening collateral requirements, the ECB has maintained its full-allotment policy, and even reduced collateral standards for some speci…c countries. Consequently, re…nancing credit in some countries kept expanding, even though the aggregate policy was becoming more restrictive. 6 See also Schnabl and Freitag (2012) for an analysis of intra-Eurosystem imbalances of the current account. Figure 3 displays the main patterns of NCBs balance sheets for two groups of countries, GIIPS and DNFL. In the upper left quadrant (Panel A), one can see that central bank credit expanded in the GIIPS up to the summer 2012, while it was falling in DNFL. This expansion of credit in the crisis countries with a parallel reduction of credit in other countries coincided with the private capital account reversal, illustrated in Figure 2 . As the balance sheet analysis suggests, this process of asymmetric liquidity provision and capital ‡ight has led to large claims and liabilities across NCBs (TARGET2 balances), depicted in Panel D of Figure 3 . At the local peak in August 2012, DNFL had accumulated e1056 bn in TARGET2 claims while GIIPS had e1000 bn in liabilities. 7 Unlike in emerging market economies during balance of payments crises, however, o¢ cial reserve holdings remained largely unchanged (see Panel B). Interestingly, the increase in TARGET2 balances that started in 2007 was initially not associated with an increase in excess reserves at central banks. 8 Reserve accounts have increased only moderately in both groups of countries, just up to the point where DNFL's re…nancing credit was to approach zero. At this point excess reserves in the DNFL jumped sharply upwards while the reserve accounts in the GIIPS remained at their low level (Panel C).
Stylized Fact 4: In 2011, re…nancing credit provided by the GIIPS was exceeding its aggregate trend growth in the euro area.
The dual strategy-a monetary contraction in the aggregate with a parallel expansion in some countries-was bound to lead to a con ‡ict eventually. Figure 4 shows that the two developments became incompatible shortly before the ECB abolished its exit strategy. In the summer of 2011, the GIIPS' re…nancing credit was nearly as large as the re…nancing credit in the euro area as a whole. Any further credit provision in these countries could not have been o¤set by a reduction in re…nancing credit in other countries. Instead, aggregate re…nancing credit-and thus the exit strategy of the euro area as a whole-would be a¤ected. Ex ante, of course, markets could not know how the ECB would react to such a con ‡ict: Would it enforce its exit strategy, or would it accommodate the expansionary path of some of the NCBs by providing liquidity in the aggregate? When the gap between re…nancing credit in the GIIPS and the trend growth projection of the aggregate reached a critically low level, there was tension in the markets, which was visible in rising euro break-up expectations. At the end of 2011, …nancial markets clearly sensed that the euro area had reached a critical limit, where policies of NCBs and those of the ECB council would become incompatible. This general sense of uncertainty about the euro area as a whole is visible in proxies for euro break-up risk. Panel A of Figure 5 , for instance, displays the implied break-up probability from the private betting platform Intrade. The probability of a break-up, according to these data, was never as high as in the fourth quarter of 2011, when the implied probability of at least a partial break-up of the euro area reached about 60%. It only substantially declined after the announcement of the OMT program in the third quarter of 2012, where it fell below 10%. 9 Panel B of Figure 5 shows the number of Google searches for "Euro Break-up." 10 The graphs show that these searches were never as high as in November 2011, shortly before the ECB abolished its exit strategy. III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I   2010 The markets' realization that the expansionary course of some NCBs would soon no longer be consistent with the ECB exit strategy, has generated a development that is highly reminiscent of a speculative attack within the euro area. The timing of the attack is best illustrated in weekly data on the Euro-USD swap line ( Figure 6 ). Stylized Fact 6: When banks started using the ECB-FED swap line, the ECB abolished its exit strategy. Figure 6 shows that, since its reintroduction in December 2007, this swap line was hardly used until early December 2011. To interpret this graph, which shows a sharp spike on December 8, 2011, it is important to be aware of the institutional details and exact timing of monetary policy operations: In order to borrow from the NCBs in regular open market operations or swap lines, private banks need to place their requests for funding the day before the day of the allotment. Policymakers at the ECB thus knew about the demand for foreign exchange (FX) loans via the swap line the evening before the monetary expansion and the abolishment of the exit strategy was announced. A big jump in FX lending would have been interpreted as a sign of a beginning process of currency substitution, a clear signal of an imminent balance of payments crisis for the euro area as a whole.
To prevent this path of events, the ECB was forced to abandon its exit strategy. On the morning of December 8, the ECB announced that it would ‡ood the markets with liquidity by (a) reducing the minimum reserve requirement, (b) lowering the collateral standards and (c) o¤ering a three-year longer-term re…nancing operation (LTRO). II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II   2010 The patterns in the euro area are highly reminiscent of those in other well-known balance of payments crises. They are, for example, closely analogous to the Mexican crisis of 1994, which had a similar starting point, but a di¤erent ending. Panel A of Figure 7 illustrates the Mexican case. In the run-up to the Tequila Crisis in the fall of 1994, the central bank of Mexico expanded the monetary base by buying government bonds and lending to banks against government bonds as collateral. This liquidity, however, was not used for investment in the domestic economy, but rather for capital ‡ight to the United States. Investors simply converted the Mexican peso to US dollars at the …xed exchange rate and purchased US assets. Trying to sustain the …xed exchange rate regime, the central bank of Mexico was forced to run down its international reserves. At some point, when reserves hit a critically low level, a speculative attack set in and forced the central bank to abandon the exchange rate peg (see Sachs et al., 1996) .
Similar to Mexico (see Panel B of Figure 7 ), the GIIPS have been expanding central bank credit against government bonds and other collateral. The liquidity created in this operation was, to a large extent, not used for domestic investment, but rather for capital ‡ight. Unlike Mexico, the GIIPS NCBs did not run down their international reserves. Instead, they accumulated TARGET2 liabilities.
While the dynamics of the two speculative attacks were similar, there are also some di¤erences: First, the euro area did not break apart, but the Mexican peso-US dollar peg did in November 1994. This is because the ECB abolished its exit strategy on December 8, 2011. Second, the crisis countries did not lose their international reserves. Instead, they have accumulated large TARGET2 liabilities and the central banks in DNFL have accumulated TARGET2 claims. The TARGET2 system can-on an abstract level-be interpreted as an unlimited swap line among the members of the Eurosystem. Stylized Fact 8: The euro area also reached sensitive political limits.
In addition to the con ‡ict between ECB policy for the aggregate euro area and actions of individual NCBs, the euro area also reached sensitive political limits towards the end of 2011. Panel A of Figure 8 shows the claims and liabilities of the German Bundesbank that result from open market operations. As money created in the GIIPS was wire transferred via the TARGET2 system, there was an abundance of liquidity in Germany. As domestic banks stopped borrowing from the Bundesbank, it needed to accept liabilities to …nancial markets-in form of private banks' reserve deposits-as a byproduct of executing the private wire transfers to Germany. Panel B of Figure 8 shows that the German Bundesbank had become a net borrower vis-à-vis its private banking system at the beginning of 2011. While not constituting a technical limit as long as banks were willing to hold deposits at their central bank, this process clearly might hit a political limit at some point. An indicator that a political limit had been reached at the Bundesbank is a letter written by the Bundesbank president, Jens Weidmann, to the ECB president, Mario Draghi, on February 29, 2012, where he asks for better collateral standards in the countries in crisis and points towards the enormous TARGET2 balances that had accumulated during the preceding …ve years. This letter is reminiscent of the famous Emminger Letter-also written by a Bundesbank president and directed to Helmut Schmidt, the chancellor of Germany, in 1978. In this letter, Emminger pointed out the enormous risk of supporting a two-sided …xed exchange rate regime up to an unlimited amount of central bank interventions. 11 Schmidt's answer to Emminger was to sign the treaty and-if worst comes to worst-argue that the conditions under which the treaty has been signed have changed and abandon the peg if needed. Translating this to current events would mean that the Bundesbank, at any point, could refer to agreements such as the no-bailout clause, the Maastricht treaty or the prohibition of monetary …nancing of sovereigns and stop executing TARGET2 transfers if these are deemed to be excessive. In fact, Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012) pointed out that the Bretton Woods system had broken apart for a similar reason. In the 1970s, the Bundesbank had become a net borrower with respect to the …nancial sector. Its net position, shown in Panel B of Figure 8 , reached a value of about 80 bn. German Mark or about 5% of GDP. The peak in its net-borrowing position in the most recent episode was, in contrast, nearly 328 bn. German Mark, constituting roughly 14% of GDP in 2012-i.e., three times as large as in 1973. In fact, Panel B of Figure 8 shows that, at a weekly frequency, the time pattern of the net position of the Bundesbank prior to the breakup of the Bretton Woods system in March 1973 was very similar to the one prior to the "Big Bazooka" in December 2011.
Europe' s Trilemma: A Central Bank Perspective
In the following section, we rationalize the empirical patterns described above from a central bank perspective. To this end, we analyze how capital ‡ight a¤ects the balance sheets of NCBs and the common central bank. This allows us to identify a set of constraints from which Europe's version of the trilemma emerges.
Central bank balance sheets in a currency union
To illustrate the constraints of the Eurosystem, we consider the following setting: Two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, form a currency union. 12 They establish a common central bank (CCB), which sets monetary policy. Monetary policy operations, however, are undertaken by NCBs. In particular, the provision of central bank money remains in the responsibility of the NCBs in accordance with common monetary policy.
Central bank liabilities consist of money in circulation (M) and deposits of commercial banks on their reserve accounts (D). Re…nancing credit (C) and international reserves (R) form the central banks'assets. In practice, other assets including government bonds constitute an additional item on the asset side of central bank balance sheets. For simplicity, we abstain from explicitly including it in this analysis and assume that other assets are held constant. 13 Moreover, we do not consider net worth, which might show up on the liability side as an accounting item.
In addition, this currency union is characterized by the unique feature that NCBs may accumulate liabilities and claims towards each other. These are called TARGET positions (T). The interesting feature of TARGET assets is that they may become negative. They exist in the form of assets and liabilities. In the aggregate over all countries they sum up to zero and thus T 1 = T 2 . This is empirically con…rmed by the opposed behavior of TARGET2 balances in GIIPS and DNFL countries as shown in Panel D of Figure 3 above. The other asset types-re…nancing credit and foreign reservesin turn, cannot fall below zero (refer to Figure 3 to track the behavior of these asset types in the euro area). 14 
This model may easily be expanded to the case of n countries. Alternatively, Countries 1 and 2 may be interpreted as two groups of countries, with target assets and target liabilities, respectively. 1 3 A balance sheet presentation including government bonds may be found in Appendix A.2. 1 4 Unconventional monetary policies may allow central banks to hold net domestic liabilities. This presupposes that central banks issue their own securities. By way of example, the issuance of debt certi…cates by the ECB is one of its instruments for open market operations. To date, however, this tool has not been used. Moreover, legally, the ECB, but not the NCBs, is allowed to issue debt. Similarly, a central bank may have net liabilities in foreign currency. This, however, implies that foreign entities provide credit to the central bank. Examples are central bank swap lines.
The consolidated balance sheet of the currency union corresponds to the sum of the balance sheets of NCBs. 15 Variables without index denote currency union-wide aggregates, e.g. M = M 1 + M 2 . A bar over a variable denotes …xed values.
Assume for simplicity that both NCBs are of equal size such that each accounts for half of the assets of the consolidated balance sheet. This capital share is determined when the currency union is created. It is …xed over time. The division of the components of the consolidated balance sheet between the NCBs, however, is not predetermined. Theoretically, the entire re…nancing credit can move to the balance sheet of one NCB. The accounting identity implies for the currency union that
where i is a country index. Let us assume that monetary policy is determined by the common central bank, which targets the evolution of the monetary base de…ned as M 0 = M + D: 16 This assumption is consistent with Stylized Fact 1, which shows that the ECB was following an exit strategy for the euro area in its entirety. By implication, union-wide central bank assets are constant. Although NCBs maintain their full-allotment policy, the balance sheet of the common central bank cannot be extended in the aggregate.
Assets consist of reserves and re…nancing credit. For simpli…cation, we assume that NCBs hold their reserve levels constant because they are not allowed to intervene in the foreign exchange market without approval of the common central bank. 17 By implication, union-wide supply of re…nancing credit is constant.
Proposition 1 (Balance sheet constraint in a consolidated currency union)
For M 0 = M 0 and R = R , it follows from equation (1) that C = C.
Let us turn to the individual NCBs'balance sheets. The balance sheet constraint (1) augmented by intra currency union TARGET claims and liabilities implies for each NCB:
This identity shows that an increase in re…nancing credit, C i , must be balanced by a decrease (liability) of T i assets or an increase in the monetary base M 0 i . Remember that the NCBs'monetary base may increase or decrease; the constraint of a constant monetary base only applies to the monetary union as a whole.
Proposition 2 (Balance sheet constraint for individual members of the currency union)
If in a monetary union with NCBs (1) M 0 = M 0 and (2)
Proof. Given that T 1 = T 2 , (2) can be rewritten for Country 1 as
Aggregating over both countries, one gets 1 5 In practice, NCBs might transfer capital to the common central bank. From an accounting perspective, however, it makes no di¤erence whether the common central bank is endowed with its own capital, whether its capital enters as a liability towards the NCBs or whether its own balance sheet is empty. In any case, the union-wide central bank balance sheet is not a¤ected by the distribution of intra-Eurosystem claims and liabilities. 1 6 Provided that the money multiplier is stable, this is in line with a policy of money targeting where the central bank's target is a money aggregate like M 1; M 2 or M 3. The ECB, for instance, monitors developments of M 3 and its components as part of its two-pillar strategy of monetary policy. 1 To hold the union-wide monetary base constant, any increase C 1 has to be o¤set by an equal decrease C 2 . This means that an increase in re…nancing credit in one country is o¤set by an equal decrease in re…nancing credit in the union's remaining countries. 18 We call this mechanism reserve constraint because of its similarity to the ‡ow of reserves between central banks outside a monetary union in the face of a balance of payments de…cit.
Corollary 1 If the amount of aggregate re…nancing credit is constant and …nite, re…nancing credit provided by an individual NCB cannot grow inde…nitely.
TARGET balances thus can be expressed as the di¤erence between monetary base and re…nancing credit:
While, legally, there exists no upper or lower limit to TARGET balances, TARGET liabilities are constrained by the other central bank's ability to accumulate TARGET assets.
Proposition 3 (TARGET constraint)
If the common central bank follows an exit strategy for the entire monetary union (M 0 = M 0), there exists an upper limit for TARGET balances, given by
Proof. The formula can be derived from equation (4) after setting M 0 i = M 0 1 + M 0 2 = M 0 and C 2 = 0: TARGET balances may not exceed the aggregate monetary base minus reserves of the NCB with TARGET claims. This limit is reached when re…nancing credit of the NCB with a positive TARGET position has fallen to zero. Except reserves, all assets of the NCB with TARGET claims have been transformed into TARGET claims.
Imbalances
In the following sections, we examine under which conditions the TARGET constraint might become binding. To this end, we consider two possible scenarios: (i) a current account de…cit in Country 1 (foreign country) with respect to Country 2 (home country), which is not …nanced by private capital ‡ows and (ii) capital ‡ight from Country 1 to Country 2. Both transactions imply that foreign agents exchange foreign central bank money for home central bank money as described in Appendix A. With respect to central bank accounting, both transactions are identical: They increase re…nancing credit of NCB 1 in exchange for growing liabilities of NCB 1 towards NCB 2 . These scenarios correspond to the developments in the euro area as described in Stylized Fact 2.
Imbalances without currency union
To highlight the particularities of a currency union, we …rst describe the e¤ects for countries that supply their own money. A cross-border transaction from Country 1 to Country 2 implies that NCB 1 loses reserves and its balance sheet contracts (see Figure 7 of the stylized facts for an illustration of the fall in international reserves in Mexico during the Tequila Crisis). Sterilization via the provision of re…nancing credit allows NCB 1 to restore the balance sheet total and to keep the amount of central 1 8 It is worth noting that we abstract from the presence of other assets on the central bank balance sheets. In practice, these may provide some additional leeway: To hold the monetary base constant, central banks may o¤set an increase in re…nancing credit by a sale of other assets (e.g. government bonds) instead of reducing re…nancing credit in the other country. However, once all other assets were sold, the limits as described above apply. Moreover, NCB 2 may issue debt certi…cates when C 2 = 0. This, however, would be an unconventional policy and has to be announced well in advance to impede an attack. If speculators question the sustainability of the central bank balance sheet, the announcement itself might provoke an attack. In theory, deposits of commercial banks on their reserve accounts provide an alternative source to fund cross-border transactions without a¤ecting the monetary base. bank money constant. The NCB 2 's balance sheet is a¤ected by opposed transactions: The net in ‡ow of money increases its reserves and its liabilities to the banking sector. The increase in central bank money can be sterilized through a reduction in re…nancing credit.
Note that, for both NCBs, the transaction changes the supply of central bank money in the …rst place. Sterilization allows the balance sheet length to remain constant and the transactions materialize as an accounting exchange on the asset side. The maximum amount of sterilization, however, is limited: When NCB 2 's assets are entirely held in the form of foreign exchange, further in ‡ows of reserves cannot be sterilized. Comparably, the external resources of NCB 1 are limited. When NCB 1 has lost all reserves, cross-border payments can no longer be …nanced.
Imbalances in a currency union

Central bank balance sheet accounting perspective
In a currency union, the same net capital ‡ows a¤ect central bank balance sheets in the following way: Since we only consider transactions within the currency union, the aggregate balance sheet of the system of central banks remains unchanged. The foreign central bank increases re…nancing credit and accumulates liabilities with respect to the home central bank (TARGET liabilities increase). Note that the TARGET position basically assumes the function played by reserves of an individual central bank operating outside a currency union: While an independent central bank runs down its reserves to …nance a balance of payments de…cit, a NCB operating in a currency union accumulates liabilities towards other member central banks. The home central bank registers opposing e¤ects: Its re…nancing credit decreases while its TARGET assets increase. These similarities between reserves in a …xed exchange rate system and re…nancing credit in a currency union are described for the case of Mexico and the euro area in Stylized Fact 7.
The di¤erences are striking: Outside a currency union, capital out ‡ows contract the central bank balance sheet and central bank money is destroyed. Capital in ‡ows create central bank money. Within a currency union, neither capital in ‡ows nor capital out ‡ows a¤ect the amount of central bank money. That is, the e¤ects of capital ‡ows on the provision of central bank money are automatically sterilized.
However, analogously to the case of independent central banks, the capacity to sterilize within a monetary union is limited. Sterilization implies that domestic assets decrease in the country with capital in ‡ows. When C 2 = 0, TARGET balances reach their upper limit (see equation (5)) and further capital in ‡ows cannot be sterilized. The increase in reserves is replaced by an increase in claims towards the other central bank. In other words, while outside a currency union assets are transferred between central banks, within a union this transaction is replaced by a claim on the assets of the other central bank. 19 There exists also an analogy with central bank swap lines, which have been institutionalized during the recent …nancial crisis (see Stylized Fact 6). While a swap line allows the central bank to transfer money without tapping its stock of reserves, TARGET liabilities allow money transactions without transfer of securities. As such, the TARGET assets of the home central bank can be interpreted as a swap line provided to the foreign central bank.
Balance of payments accounting perspective
The implications of TARGET balances can alternatively be illustrated by the balance of payments identity, which can be expressed for country i as
where CA is the balance of the current account and KA denotes the balance of capital and …nancial account. 20 KA may be split in changes in the net foreign asset position of the central bank (KA CB ) and changes in the net foreign asset position of the rest of the economy (KA P R ). The net foreign asset position of the central bank may change due to changes in international reserves, changes in TARGET balances and changes in other central bank assets ( OCB). Hence, equation (6) can alternatively be expressed as
This expression shows the following: First, any de…cit in the current-cum-…nancial account can be …nanced through the sale of reserves by the central bank. This is the policy of exchange rate defense through foreign exchange market interventions. Second, in a currency union, the TARGET settlement system provides additional ‡exibility to …nance imbalances within the union. To …nance a de…cit, NCBs can accumulate liabilities towards other member central banks. This can be considered as an alternative way to defend the …xed exchange rate system between members. 21 
Proposition 4 (Re…nancing credit's role as reserves)
If the common central bank follows an aggregate exit strategy (M 0 = M 0); the ability to …nance balance of payments de…cits within the currency union is restricted by the availability of re…nancing credit in the surplus country.
Proof. For given liabilities, NCB 2 can only further increase T 2 if C 2 falls. Hence, the balance of payments identity of Country 1 reads
As such, re…nancing credit of the home central bank assumes the same role as international reserves do for a central bank issuing its own currency: They fall until they reach a lower bound. Payments can only be settled until C 2 = 0.
Implications
The TARGET system has two implications: In the short run, it provides ‡exibility. It bu¤ers imbalances within a currency union. NCBs provide liquidity to each other without a¤ecting their international reserves. In the long run, however, TARGET positions reach a limit very much alike international reserves may be exhausted. TARGET liabilities reach their limit when re…nancing credit in the partner country has fallen to zero. Net transactions from Country 1 to Country 2 may no longer be feasible. As a corollary of Proposition 1, rational agents anticipate that the system of central banks can choose between three scenarios.
2 0 According to the IMF's de…nition, …nancial transactions are recorded either in the …nancial or capital account. For simplicity, we aggregate both accounts and refer to them as …nancial account in the rest of the paper. 2 1 Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012, p. 488) also show that the balance of payments identity of euro countries is augmented by the TARGET position and state that "the increase of a country's Target liability over one year, i.e. its Target de…cit, equals the sum of (private and public) net capital exports and the current account de…cit vis-à-vis other euro countries." Corollary 2 Persistent balance of payments de…cits vis-à-vis other countries of a currency union will eventually require one of the following policy responses: (i) Transactions from Country 1 to Country 2 are no longer executed, (ii) the currency union collapses, or (iii) the common central bank pursues an expansionary monetary policy and the common currency depreciates with respect to the rest of the world.
Corollary 2 illustrates Europe's version of the trilemma. One of three potential policy goals must be waived. In scenario (i) the unidirectional suspension of transactions from Country 1 to Country 2 lowers the value of deposits in Country 1 relative to those in Country 2. The market exchange rate deviates from the o¢ cially …xed rate. If the currency union breaks up (scenario ii) the exchange rate of Country 1 depreciates relative to Country 2 and restores the equilibrium in the balance of payments. Since the sterilized expansion of TARGET balances is no longer feasible, in scenario (iii) the common central bank relaxes this constraint by an expansionary monetary policy. M; the interest rate and the price level rise. Real money balances drop. The currency depreciates with respect to the rest of the world.
Anticipation of scenarios (i) and (ii) may induce speculative capital ‡ight to Country 2, while the best ex-ante response to scenario (iii) is to move funds outside of the currency union. The insights of the literature on speculative attacks on …xed exchange rate systems apply (see Flood and Garber, 1984; Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld, 1994) . The nature of the attack depends on speculators'expectations about the currency union's endogenous response to the tensions: The speculative attack may be directed either on the TARGET system or on the entire currency union. It depends on whether scenarios (i) and (ii) or scenario (iii) are the expected policy response. While the expected policy response a¤ects the nature of the attack, its timing is independent of whether capital is reallocated within the union or whether it ‡ows outside.
Europe' s Trilemma: An Investor' s Perspective
While the previous sections used central bank balance sheets to illustrate Europe's policy trilemma, the following portfolio balance model focuses on the behavior of international investors. 22 We show that, depending on the size of capital ‡ight, the central bank may be left with two incompatible policy objectives of either preventing a surge of break-up expectations or keeping money supply …xed. Investors'uncertainty of how the central bank would respond to such a predicament make the currency union vulnerable to speculative attacks.
Basic model setup
In our model, a representative international investor chooses between three types of assets to optimize his portfolio in a given period: Bonds (B), deposits (excess reserves) at the NCB (D), and money (M ). Bonds and deposits are country speci…c, 23 whereas there is only one form of cash, independent of the country of issue (common currency). The volume of bonds is expressed in terms of the nominal bond value. The market value of a bond is a multiple P of its nominal value. Variables referring to the foreign country are denoted with asterisks. The international investor is meant to re ‡ect the aggregate of wealth owners living in either of the two countries that constitute a currency union.
The investor chooses to allocate his portfolio subject to a wealth constraint. The net worth (W) of today's portfolio is
The nominal exchange rate (e) is the price of home currency in terms of foreign currency. It is …xed at unity in the currency union of our model, e = 1. The expected exchange rate at the end of the period, e e; however, may deviate from its …xed value. Our investor's utility function depends on the end-of-period wealth and a liquidity service: 
The exogenous liquidity parameters, , , , ; , capture all sorts of considerations other than pecuniary return (e.g., risk preferences, di¤erences in liquidity, and transaction costs). Tildes mark expected values. For simplicity, we do not impose a speci…c functional form on the utility function other than it being increasing in its parameters, strictly concave and additively separable.
The investor maximizes the following Lagrangian with respect to the volumes of each asset class: 
The …rst line captures the end-of-period wealth in terms of domestic currency, with r and i denoting the yield on bonds and the interest rate paid on the deposit holdings, respectively. The second line shows the utility derived from the liquidity service, and the third line accounts for the investor's budget constraint.
From the …rst-order conditions, we derive the following marginal conditions: 
The Lagrangian multiplier, , re ‡ects a common yardstick. The marginal utility derived from each asset ought to be the same in optimum. We do not explicitly solve for all variables of the model. Most important insights can be derived by performing comparative statics and by simply inspecting the relevant equations.
Flight-to-safety with a passive central bank
As a …rst step, we assume the central bank to be completely passive. For example, the central bank does not conduct any open market operations or lend against collateral. Thus, the stocks of risky and safe bonds in the economy are …xed in the short term (B = B, B = B ) . The central bank holds the stock of money constant (M = M ) and the common yardstick, , is determined by equation (12) .
While deposits are freely transferable across countries, their sum D + D is also …xed because wealth is constant and there are no other types of investment available.
We now ask how our investor's optimal portfolio changes when his preferences change. More speci…cally, we consider the e¤ect of a negative shock in the preference for (risky) foreign bonds and a positive shock in the preference for (safe) home bonds. This decrease in with a joint increase in may represent a ‡ight-to-safety motivation. 24 Only equations (10) and (13) are a¤ected. The change in preferences simply changes the return of both bonds. With the supply of bonds being …xed, a decreased preference for foreign bonds has to be accommodated by an increase in their return, r =P . On the other hand, an increase in the preference for home bonds translates into a decreased return, r=P . 25 No further portfolio adjustments are needed to maintain the portfolio equilibrium. Particularly, neither the exchange rate nor money supply change. For example, from equation (11) follows that the expected exchange rate does not change because the yardstick, , is constant and all other variables are una¤ected by the shock considered. In this setting the investor cannot engage in capital ‡ight, as quantities are …xed. The returns simply adjust to a point where he is content with holding the assets that he has.
Flight-to-safety with an active central bank
Next, we consider the case of an active central bank such as the European System of Central Banks after introducing a full-allotment policy. Investors are able to borrow against collateral at the NCB. They will be credited the nominal value of these bonds to their deposit facility in return: 26 D = B and D = B . 27 By implication, the stocks of each type of asset become ‡exible. In the case of an active central bank, it is useful to distinguish between two magnitudes of shocks, which correspond to two di¤erent phases of capital ‡ight during the euro crisis.
Phase I
In Phase I, we consider the same shock as before-a decrease in with a joint increase in . If we assume that money supply is constant, is determined by equation (12) and is constant across all marginal conditions. Pledging foreign bonds as collateral at the NCB reduces the supply of foreign bonds available to trade in the markets. Consequently, their marginal utility, U B , increases. The investor gets credited deposits at the foreign central bank in return, which decreases the marginal utility of such deposits, U D . From equation (11) and (14) it is evident that the investor will …nd it optimal to reallocate his portfolio:
To satisfy this condition, a transfer of deposits from the foreign NCB to the home NCB takes place and frees up collateral, which had previously been pledged at the home NCB: B rises. The increase in the stock of home bonds, B, in turn, decreases their marginal utility, U B . This process continues until equation (15) is ful…lled. With the common interest rate …xed, this implies in equilibrium that all deposits return to their original levels. They are transferred to the home country and invested in home bonds. 2 4 See also Westermann (2012 Westermann ( , 2014 and Appendix A. 2 5 This may either mean a change of prices or coupons or a combination of both. For the purpose of clarity of our argument, we simply attribute any change in the return of bonds to price changes. That is, we assume …xed-coupon bonds. This does not alter any of the results. 2 6 Drechsler et al. (2016) and Steinkamp et al. (2017) document that NCBs in the euro area applied substantially lower haircuts compared to private markets throughout the crisis. 2 7 Similar to open market operations of the US FED, bonds could alternatively be sold to the central bank. It only matters that bonds (i) can be used to create central bank liquidity in the size of the market value of the bonds and (ii) are not available to be traded in the market any more.
Phase II
The type of capital ‡ight described in Phase I cannot go on inde…nitely. While the full-allotment policy ensures that arbitrarily large amounts of bonds can be absorbed by the NCB in the foreign country ( D = B ), the amount of bonds provided indirectly by the home NCB is limited. At some point, no collateral is freed up because re…nancing credit at the receiving country's central bank has already been run down to zero. 28 In other words, we need to assume the stock of home bonds to be …xed at B = B:
Again, following a (large) preference change, investors will pledge the bonds as collateral for re…nancing credit at the foreign central bank at their nominal value. Therefore, B decreases accompanied by a rise in D . But there is no corresponding increase in B that would absorb the additional deposits created. In this case, there are two possible equilibrium portfolios. The central bank can either (i) let expectations about a currency break-up rise: e e falls below unity. 29 (ii) Stop its full-allotment policy or (iii) abandon its monetary target.
First, when the central bank sticks to its monetary target, as well as the full-allotment policy, break-up expectations arise. As M = M , is constant according to equation (12) . To satisfy equation (14) , D must be constant as well. The e¤ect on the expected exchange rate can be derived from equation (11) after solving for e e:
The marginal utility, U D , decreases because D increases. However, the new liquidity can be invested in neither M nor B. e e falls: exchange rate expectations indicate an appreciation of the home currency.
Second, the ECB could stop its full-allotment policy. This would prevent capital ‡ight altogether, as investors can no longer borrow from the NCB against collateral. It would be equivalent to becoming a passive central bank, associated with the price changes on safe and risky assets discussed above.
Third, the central banks could also forego their monetary target and tolerate an increase in M . In this case the common yardstick, , is no longer …xed as the marginal utility of money falls (see equation 12 ). From equation (16) can be inferred that the investor will again transfer part of the deposits into the deposit facility of the home country: D rises. However, deposits will not fall back to their original level as the stock of home bonds remains the same. In equation (13) , the marginal increase in preferences for home bonds will be o¤set by an increase in prices. Capital does not ‡ow from deposits into home bonds anymore. A rise in deposits reduces their marginal utility. According to equations (11), (12) and (14), the Lagrangian variable and the marginal utility of cash holdings, U M , must be lower compared to preshock levels, which is due to an increase in the stock of money, M . Summing up, not only cash increases, but also the aggregate of both countries'deposits, D + D .
Dynamics and target of the speculative attack
In the above analysis, we analyze an essentially static equilibrium and perform comparative statics with respect to preference changes on speci…c items of assets. What was modeled as a shock in the second phase could also be a series of small shocks, or a continuous process based on a country's fundamentals, like an ongoing balance of payments de…cit. With such a process in mind, our model helps to understand the dynamics of the euro crisis, which are similar to …rst generation speculative attack models.
From an investors' point of view, one could raise the question whether capital ‡ight has been "successful"and whether there is any other motivation except the pure change in preferences. Indeed, one can argue that our portfolio model adds a motivation for the attack, based on anticipated price changes. To illustrate this point it is interesting to look at the price of foreign bonds in terms of home bonds:
Equation (17) describes the e¤ective rate of exchange between both types of bonds. From the perspective of a representative investor holding foreign bonds, this indicates whether capital ‡ight can be "successful" in the sense that he is able to indirectly convert risky foreign bonds into safe home bonds at favorable prices. With a passive central bank and the stock of assets …xed (and thereby also their marginal utilities, U B and U B , …xed), any shock in preferences simply translates into price (and yield) changes. After an increase in and a decrease in , the total return of foreign bonds relative to home bonds is lower than in the preshock equilibrium. Holders of foreign bonds cannot avoid taking losses.
Once we consider an active central bank, however, this result changes. Despite the change in preferences away from foreign bonds into home bonds, their relative rate of return does not change. During Phase I, changes in preferences are completely o¤set by changes in the supply of risky bonds, B ; and safe bonds, B; without any further need for price adjustments. Compared to the case with a passive central bank, an investor holding foreign bonds is better o¤ now-thus capital ‡ight via the Eurosystem of central banks can be considered successful. This result, however, hinges critically on the fact that a wire transfer reduces the need for central bank liquidity and frees up collateral in the receiving country.
In Phase II, independent of the central bank's policy decision, (P =P ) decreases according to equation (17) . Compared to the case with an active central bank in Phase I, an investor holding foreign bonds is worse o¤. Holders of foreign bonds cannot engage in capital ‡ight anymore without taking losses.
Thus, capital ‡ight cannot go on successfully forever. When the amount of re…nancing credit in the receiving country reaches a critically low limit, investors might anticipate that not all of them can trade their foreign bonds into home bonds at a favorable rate of exchange. Because everybody knows that not everybody can get his money out without losses, everybody will uncoordinatedly try to be among the …rst: A speculative attack occurs, forcing the central bank to either let the exchange rate in the currency union ‡oat, or to give up its independent monetary policy.
Exchange Market Pressure in the Euro Area
In the previous sections we have used theoretical consideration to show that the ECB faces a trilemma. Both a model based on central bank balance sheets and the portfolio balance model suggest that in the presence of capital ‡ight the ECB either faces break-up expectations of the currency union or needs to give up its monetary target. In the following section, we examine whether this trilemma may be identi…ed empirically. To this end, we develop a new exchange market pressure index for the euro area and analyze its behavior around the events in 2011.
In the literature, exchange market indexes are typically based on three components, namely the change in the exchange rate, the interest di¤erential between two countries and the change in reserve holdings. 30 Our index for the euro area is related to that concept, but di¤ers slightly in all three aspects. First, there is no exchange rate between the GIIPS and the rest of the euro area. Thus, exchange rate changes are zero for the full time period. Secondly, the relevant interest rate-the ECB's main re…nancing rate-is also the same in all countries of the euro area. It does not constitute a motivation to move central bank money from one country to the other.
The biggest di¤erence, however, is related to reserve holdings. On the one hand, NCBs are legally not permitted to simply buy and sell reserves without coordination with the ECB. Thus, as shown in the empirical section (see Panel B of Figure 3) , changes in international reserves of individual countries are negligible and most likely re ‡ect valuation changes rather than active purchases. On the other hand, NCBs' ability to sustain net capital out ‡ows is not limited by reserves, but-as shown in the theoretical section-by TARGET2 liabilities a country can accumulate. These liabilities are potentially limited by (i) the ECB targeting the monetary base or (ii) political factors in creditor countries. In Panel A of Figure 10 , we display the changes in the TARGET2 liabilities of the GIIPS countries, standardized by M2 of the same group of countries. While TARGET2 re ‡ects the ability to accommodate capital ‡ight, the monetary aggregate M2 proxies for the potential amount of funds that could be moved abroad via the central bank system. In May 2010, for the …rst time, the index signals an increased break-up risk. This is when government bond yields in Greece skyrocketed and the …rst bailout funds were launched. The second increase in exchange market pressure was taking place during the suspected speculative attack at the end of 2011. During the month surrounding the monetary expansion, exchange market pressure was as high as ever during the full sample period. In the aftermath of the "whatever-it-takes" statement, pressures declined and ultimately came back to normal.
With regard to the policy debate in summer 2017, new concerns of exchange market pressure could arise again. In the end of the sample, developments coincide in a way that is reminiscent of the 2011 period. First, banks in Italy are under pressure and borrow substantial amounts from the Bank of Italy that are wire transferred to the rest of Europe. Second, the ECB is discussing the next exit strategy. In combination, it is not surprising to see yet another increase in exchange market pressure towards the end of the sample period.
We externally verify our index using two alternative break-up indices. The ups and downs in our index mirror quite closely the break-up risk that is also visible in the stylized facts reported above. The simple correlation between our index and the Google "euro break-up" searches and the implied break-up risk by the Intrade betting data (see Figure 5 ) is 0.52 and 0.53, respectively. Figure 10 further compares our index of internal pressure to an adjusted index of external pressure vis-à-vis the United States as a reference country. The de…nition of external exchange market pressure follows Aizenman and Binici (2016, eq. 5). However, we slightly adjust this index to account for unconventional policy measures during the crisis. The use of international reserve holdings is not the only way to satisfy international liquidity needs and to fend o¤ speculative capital ‡ight. The USD swap line provided by the Federal Reserve Bank has become another important source of liquidity for many central banks, including the ECB. While the swap line has no publicly known upper limit, it is likely to hit a political one in the case of a speculative attack. We therefore interpret increases in the use of the swap line similar to the loss of international reserve holdings.
Panel B of
Similar to the internal-pressure index, a …rst visible peak in the external exchange market pressure index can be identi…ed in May 2010 with the onset of the Greek debt crisis. The external pressure then reaches its global maximum in December 2011, the month of the …rst LTRO, before returning to normal levels after the second LTRO. As the United States serves as a reference country, it comes as no surprise that the exchange market pressure of the euro area was-in comparison to the US-very low at the time of the Lehman Brothers-collapse in the fall of 2009.
We further calculate internal exchange market pressure on a country-level basis (shown in Figure  11 ). This helps to gain insights into the heterogeneous nature of the crisis across countries. 31 Panel A of Figure 11 depicts the internal exchange rate pressure of Greece vis-à-vis the rest of the Eurosystem. There are two visible spikes in the exchange rate pressure deviating more than two standard deviations from the mean. The …rst was at the time of the …rst Greek bailout. The second, more dramatic increase, happened shortly after the snap election in which the eurosceptic party Syriza won the majority of seats in the parliament. Ireland was one of the …rst countries to feel the repercussions of the Global Financial Crisis (Panel B). As early as March 2009 …rst tensions are visible. Another high was reached after what the press called "Ireland's Black Thursday,"when the bailout of its banking system was announced to hit e50 bn. Italy's increase in internal exchange market pressure, in contrast, manifested rather late; starting before the announcement of the …rst LTRO and returning to normal after the launch of the second LTRO (Panel C). Panel D shows that Portugal experienced a strong increase in the volatility of exchange market pressure. At several points in time, starting in mid-2010, pressure exceeded two standard deviations. Lastly, Panel E depicts Spain's internal exchange market pressure. Similar to most of the other countries, the …rst spike occurred in May 2010. Spain then returned to normal levels, only to …nd itself on an upward path again by the beginning of 2011. The pressure reached its maximum in March 2012 and only calmed down after Mario Draghi's commitment to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. The decline in internal pressure after his statement is visible not only in Spain but also-to a larger or lesser extent-in the other countries of the euro area. The promise to conduct a potentially unlimited monetary expansion …nally relieved the internal exchange market pressure. This lasted until the ECB started to verbally hint at the possibility of an exit strategy from its expansionary policies. 
Related Literature
Our …ndings suggest that policy choices in a currency union-especially of the European type-are restricted by a trilemma: In the face of free capital mobility, central banks may not be able to pursue a prede…ned monetary policy, such as an exit strategy, while simultaneously accommodating capital ‡ight via a full-allotment policy. These policy decisions are incompatible and ultimately generate break-up expectations on the side of investors. This is a special version of the classical macroeconomic policy trilemma (Mundell, 1963; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998) applied to currency unions. 32 The main di¤erence lies in the interpretation of monetary dependence: When the exchange rate is …xed and capital internationally mobile, the classical trilemma predicts that monetary policy is determined by the world interest rate through spillovers from center countries. In a currency union, however, the trilemma restriction applies also within the union independently of the international policy environment. After a certain threshold, the amount of net cross-border ‡ows within the union determines the degree of monetary expansion. That is, although the euro is ‡oating with respect to the rest of the world, monetary policy cannot be set freely.
As the global …nancial crisis has highlighted global interdependencies, the trilemma constraint has gained renewed interest, which shows up in a number of recently published papers. The discussion centers around the question whether the trilemma is still relevant in a highly integrated world. Three di¤erent views may be distinguished: First, in a series of papers, Rey (2013 Rey ( , 2016 argues that the global …nancial cycle has transformed the trilemma into a dilemma. A ‡oating exchange rate regime is unable to isolate the economy from foreign shocks because capital ‡ows obey global factors rather than domestic ones. This …nding is in line with evidence provided by Frankel et al. (2004) for the post-Bretton Woods period. Second, a di¤erent view argues that central banks'international reserves help to relax the trilemma constraint and basically turned it in a quadrilemma (Aizenman, 2013; Steiner, 2017) . The third view argues that the trilemma trade-o¤ is still a valid description of the international monetary system (see, among others, Georgiadis and Mehl, 2016; Obstfeld et al., 2017) . Recent empirical evidence based on trilemma indexes supports the trilemma constraint (Aizenman et al., 2013; Klein and Shambaugh, 2015) . 33 This con…rms …ndings from previous decades (Shambaugh, 2004; Obstfeld et al., 2005) . Finally, there is a literature that puts the trilemma in a wider context by changing one of its corners leading to a …nancial or policy trilemma besides the monetary one. 34 Policies inconsistent with the trilemma constraint might induce a speculative attack. Speculative attacks are the response to the depletion of resources in …xed-price environments: A shrinking stock of natural resources at …xed prices in the Hotelling-Salant-Henderson model (see Obstfeld, 1994; Salant and Henderson, 1978) or declining reserves in …xed exchange rate systems (see Krugman, 1979) are typical examples. In our case of a currency union, re…nancing credit of the countries with net TARGET claims -and the associated safe asset collateral-is the shrinking resource.
The literature on the creation of the European Monetary Union already discussed the possibility of a speculative attack linked to the …nal bilateral conversion rates, the so-called "endgame problem." Garber (1999) , Flood and Garber (2000) , and Kenen (2000) argue that the operational rules of the TARGET system enable central banks to defend the currency union against any speculative attack. The reason for this is that NCBs can accumulate unlimited claims and liabilities towards each other. They also point out the risk of an attack, if the political support for unlimited TARGET2 balances is not given. Overall, there was a widespread consensus in the academic literature that corner solutionspurely ‡oating exchange rates and monetary unions-are not vulnerable to speculative attacks (see, e.g., Frankel, 1999) . 35 Our paper is also closely related to Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012) . This paper was the …rst to interpret the euro crisis as a balance of payments crisis and the TARGET2 liabilities as an internal balance of payments de…cit. It also raised the issue that re…nancing credit in Germany has a lower bound and capital ‡ight as well as current account …nancing via the Eurosystem cannot go on inde…nitely. There are, however, several di¤erences with respect to our paper: First, the lower bound of re…nancing credit by itself does not constitute a limit on capital ‡ows, as the NCBs with net TARGET claims are able to take deposits and in principle run a negative net balance with private banks in the Eurosystem. Thus, only the combination of the lower bound of re…nancing credit in the recipient countries of capital ‡ight and the exit strategy of the ECB (or any …xed monetary target)-Europe's trilemma-create the setting for a speculative attack. Second, Sinn and Wollmershäuser are lacking an important facet of the investors'motivation. The central banks'actions in countries with both TARGET2 claims and liabilities a¤ected the supply of safe and risky assets available for trading. The anticipated price e¤ects of these relative supply changes have fueled the dynamics of capital ‡ows shortly before the ECB gave up its exit strategy. Clearly both views do not exclude each other, but focus on a di¤erent dimension of the events in 2011/12.
Conclusions
While TARGET balances are de jure unlimited according to the statutes of the European System of Central Banks, our analysis shows that there exists a de facto limit when the system of central banks sticks to its monetary policy goals. Unlimited credit can only be provided by national central banks if monetary policy does not constrain the length of the balance sheet in the aggregate. Furthermore, political limits may exist that prevent the TARGET2 claims from moving to arbitrarily large amounts.
The analysis in this paper elaborates on this de facto limit and provides the theoretical framework and empirical background needed to discuss policy questions, such as the current debate on exit strategies from unconventional policies. A better understanding of the earlier episode is useful to improve the design of the next exit strategy and reduce the risks of future attacks under the current institutional arrangements.
Moving forward, the euro area needs to take into account what is best described as the European version of the trilemma: It cannot at the same time have a common currency, independent control over the monetary base and accommodate unlimited internal capital ‡ight via central banks. The proposed index of exchange market pressure may help policy makers and investors to monitor the implications arising from this insight.
Appendix A: Institutional Background and Bank-Level Perspective
In this appendix, we provide the institutional background of the analysis from the perspective of a single investor and a single bank engaging in capital ‡ight. In our view, this is a necessary preliminary step to understanding the portfolio balance model in Section 4 and the motivation of our exchange market pressure index derived in Section 5.
A.1 The nature of capital ‡ight, full allotment and the TARGET2 system
The capital out ‡ows of 2011, depicted in Figure 2 , can certainly be interpreted as a wave of capital ‡ight reminiscent of episodes in emerging market economies such as Latin America or Asia in the mid to late 1990s. To understand the similarities and di¤erences, it is important to analyze the institutional framework that set the stage for the capital out ‡ows. We …rst give an intuitive example for why the system of central banks and the TARGET2 clearing system played a major role in the capital account reversal and argue that, without the involvement of central banks, capital ‡ight would not have been successful.
Suppose, for instance, the central bank were entirely passive-its policies were neither expansionary nor contractionary. It would not lend to banks or conduct any open market operations. In this setting, a simple thought experiment helps to illustrate why the central banks were important: If an investor took some Spanish government bonds, for instance, put them in his backpack and took the plane from Madrid to Frankfurt, he would not have gained very much from this type of "capital ‡ight." Upon arrival in Frankfurt, he would have realized that Spanish government bonds were traded at unfavorable prices just as in Madrid. After he deposited them in a safe at the Commerzbank in Frankfurt, they would not be any more protected from default of the Spanish government or from Euro break-up risk. This layman's type of capital ‡ight would be entirely unsuccessful.
In Europe, however, the Eurosystem of central banks was not passive. In summer 2011, it had a full-allotment system in place where banks were able to borrow unlimited amounts against eligible collateral. This policy has been used by investors to engage in a more successful type of capital ‡ight via the central banking system: Instead of putting the bonds in their backpack, they gave them to the Central Bank of Spain as collateral and received Euros in exchange, in the form of deposits on a private bank's reserve account at the central bank. These deposits were then wire transferred to Germany via the TARGET2 system. The TARGET system is a clearing platform introduced at the same time as the single currency. In the euro area, all international transactions are settled in central bank money via this TARGET2 system. This is why the Bundesbank became involved in capital ‡ight. The Euros created in Spain and other countries were wire transferred to Germany and credited by the Bundesbank to a reserve account of a private bank in Germany. The investor was then able to use these deposits to buy German government bonds, real estate or equity.
The key di¤erence between the two examples is the following. In the …rst example, the investor was simply moving his risky assets from one country to another. In the second example, he was able to convert risky assets into a safe investment.
A.2 The balance sheet mechanics
In the following subsections, we examine how a transfer of deposits between two countries a¤ects the balance sheets of their commercial banks and their NCBs.
A.2.1 A transfer of deposits with passive central banks
Let us assume that there are only two private banks and two central banks. We call the private banks Santander and Commerzbank and the central banks are the Bank of Spain and the Bundesbank. 36 The private banks have three types of assets: Governments bonds (B), loans to …rms (L) and a reserve account at the central bank (D r ). Moreover, there are two types of liabilities: deposits from private households (D p ) and loans from the central bank (C). The central banks have government bonds and credit to banks as their assets and money (M ) and deposits of private banks (D r ) as liabilities. The analysis is conducted from the perspective of Germany as a "home" country and Spain as "foreign" denoted by asterisks. Suppose the owner of private deposits, D p ; would like to move his deposits from Spain to Germany. In normal times, this operation could be achieved without involvement of the central banks (other than for a brief interval when they execute the transfer). In good times, Santander would have three options to raise the liquidity needed to execute the transfer: (i) use excess reserves or borrow in the interbank market, (ii) sell some of its bonds or (iii) let some loans expire to generate the liquidity to execute the transfer. Commerzbank, on the other hand, will receive the deposits and can use them to …nance any of the same alternative investments. For instance, as illustrated in the balance sheet presentation in Figure 12 , in equilibrium it could buy those bonds sold by Santander.
A.2.2 A transfer of deposits with an active central bank
Step 1: In crisis times, we assume that (i) there is no functioning interbank market, (ii) Santander cannot sell its assets (without accepting …re-sale prices), (iii) Santander cannot easily let loans expire as a large share is nonperforming and (iv) it does not hold any excess reserves. Furthermore, we assume the central bank is active and pursues a full-allotment policy. In this case (see Figure 13 ), the withdrawal of deposits is o¤set by Santander's borrowing from the Bank of Spain. Via the TARGET2 clearing system, it is the Bundesbank's obligation to credit the deposits to the Commerzbank's reserve account. The Bank of Spain gets a claim on Santander and the Bundesbank gets a liability to Commerzbank. To o¤set this imbalance, a TARGET2 liability is recorded for the Bank of Spain and a corresponding TARGET2 claim for the Bundesbank. 37 Step 2: Of course, it is unattractive for Commerzbank to hold simultaneously deposits and loans vis-à-vis the Bundesbank. The loans have a higher interest rate than the deposits and the private bank is losing money this way. Therefore, to the extent possible, Commerzbank uses the liquidity it receives in the …rst instance to repay the loans from the Bundesbank (see Figure 14 ). An important aspect of this second step is the following: As long as Commerzbank is repaying its loans at the central bank, the total monetary base (M 0 = M + M + D r + D r ) does not increase as a result of capital ‡ight. In a way, the Bank of Spain is pursuing an expansionary monetary policy by lending to Santander and the Commerzbank is sterilizing the e¤ect on the monetary base by repaying its loans to the Bundesbank. However, this sterilization cannot last forever; it only works as long as C 0 at the Bundesbank. As the loans of Commerzbank from the Bundesbank, C, approach zero, a limit is reached, where each additional Euro transferred via the TARGET2 system will increase the monetary base. This creates a con ‡ict between two central bank objectives: price stability and …nancial stability, ensured by the free mobility of capital and the full-allotment policy. In Section 4, we attribute the strength of the capital ‡ight to investors'uncertainty on how the ECB would react to this predicament.
A.2.3 Flight to quality
Although a transfer of deposits is useful to illustrate the balance sheet mechanics, it is not the origin of capital ‡ight in the euro area. Instead, the desire of investors to convert government bonds in crisis countries into assets in safe countries is a more adequate starting point. Santander could place the government bond B , as collateral at the Bank of Spain in return for deposits that are wire transferred to Germany to buy German Bunds, B. Regardless of the motivation of capital ‡ight, the balance sheet mechanics would remain unchanged. In fact, Santander could even buy additional Spanish bonds in the rest of the world to pledge them to the central bank. The strength of a potential speculative attack could, thus, be larger than the current total amount of deposits on Santander's balance sheet. Westermann (2014), for instance, pointed out that the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector in Spain and Italy increased in 2011, which would be consistent with a ‡ight-to-quality phenomenon of a global dimension.
